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Stop criminals sending email as you.

We set up SPF, DKIM and DMARC on every domain you send from and take you, step by step, to p=reject, so a forged email from your domain is refused before it reaches residents, vendors or staff. Then we watch for lookalike domains.

SPFDKIMDMARCSPOOFED · REJECTEDp=rejectDELIVEREDINCOMING MAIL
_dmarc.your-domain.govTXT
  • Stage 1 · monitorp=none
  • Stage 2 · enforcep=quarantine
  • Stage 3 · enforcep=reject
Illustrative.

58%

of public organizations we reviewed can have their email spoofed

1in7

fully block spoofed email. Most of the rest can be spoofed.

79,796

public organizations reviewed across the lower 48

Why it matters

Most public email can be faked.

46,672 of the 79,796 public organizations we reviewed can have their email spoofed: a criminal could send messages that appear to come from them. Here is that risk by sector, as of our 2026 scan.

Share of public organizations reviewed with email spoofing risk, by sector.
  • Fire and EMS2,021 of 3,02867%
  • Towns and townships4,116 of 6,26166%
  • Libraries2,587 of 4,12763%
  • Housing authorities1,120 of 1,77163%
  • Cities8,912 of 14,51561%
  • Other special districts3,158 of 5,14961%
  • Water and sewer8,252 of 13,68860%
  • Police, 911, courts987 of 1,65060%
  • School districts9,481 of 17,03556%
  • Electric and gas1,713 of 3,13355%
  • Counties1,547 of 2,93053%
  • Other agencies985 of 2,00949%
  • Hospitals and health1,793 of 4,50040%

Source: America Secure public-data health check, 2026

Who it's for

For any organization that sends email people trust.

If residents, parents, patients or vendors act on your emails (pay a bill, change bank details, open an attachment), your domain is worth spoofing.

  • Your domain has no DMARC record, or it is stuck at p=none.
  • A vendor or resident has received a fake email that looked like it came from you.
  • Your cyber insurer or auditor has asked about SPF, DKIM or DMARC.
  • You own domains that never send email, and nothing stops someone sending from them.

How it works

Monitor first. Enforce when it is safe.

Spoofing protection fails when it is rushed: turn on enforcement too early and your own payroll or billing emails bounce. So we roll it out in stages, and get three details right on the way.

  1. Inventory

    Find every service that sends as you and every domain you own.

    The senders nobody remembers

    Payroll, utility billing, newsletters, ticketing, the copier. Each one found and set up to pass, so enforcement does not bounce the mail you rely on.

    DMARC report · sendersSample
    • Payroll providerpass
    • Utility billingpass
    • Office copier (scan to email)pass
  2. Authenticate

    Publish SPF and set up DKIM signing with each sender.

    SPF that stays valid

    One clean SPF record for each domain, kept inside the 10-lookup limit so it does not silently break when a vendor is added.

    TXT · your-domain.gov6/10 lookups
    v=spf1 include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:_spf.payroll.example ~all
  3. Monitor

    Turn on DMARC at p=none and read the reports until every real sender passes.

  4. Enforce

    Step up to quarantine, then reject, as the reports allow.

    Domains that never send, locked

    Parked and old domains get records that say they send no mail, so a criminal cannot use them in your place.

    TXT · old.govSends no mail
    v=spf1 -all_dmarc  v=DMARC1; p=reject
  5. Verify and watch

    Retest, sign the verification letter, and keep watching for lookalike domains.

The pace is set by your DMARC reports, not a fixed calendar. We agree each step with you before we take it. Records shown are illustrative.

What you get

Know who sends as you. Refuse the rest.

Email authentication report
  • Every domain and its SPF, DKIM and DMARC status
  • Every service that sends as you
  • The rollout plan, stage by stage
  • Monthly DMARC report summaries
Verification letter
After we retest your fixes, a signed letter stating what was fixed and how it was tested. Written to be handed to your board, insurer or auditor.
DMARC aggregate · your-domain.govSample · 7 days · p=reject
SourceMsgsSPFDKIMResult
Microsoft 36518,402passpassdelivered
Utility billing4,810passpassdelivered
Newsletter platform2,904passpassdelivered
Payroll provider1,236passpassdelivered
Office copier96passn/adelivered
Unknown · 203.0.113.7342failfailrejected
Aligned98.8%
Illustrative. Every real sender passes; the forged one is refused.
Ends with the signed verification letter

Questions

Questions we hear first.

Something else? team@americasecure.com

That is exactly what the staged rollout prevents. We stay at monitoring until the reports show every real sender passing, and only then move to quarantine and reject.

Not fully. SPF on its own does not stop someone forging the From address people see. A DMARC policy at enforcement does, and that is the step most organizations never reach: only 1 in 7 of the public organizations we reviewed fully block spoofed email.

No. This works with Microsoft 365, Google Workspace and on-premises mail servers. The changes are DNS records and settings in the services you already use.

A domain made to pass a quick glance, such as one letter swapped or a different ending. Criminals register them to send convincing fake invoices. We alert you when we find one so you can warn staff and request a takedown.

Access to make DNS changes (or someone on your side who can), and a list of the vendors that send email for you. We help you find the ones nobody remembers.

Start with an evaluation.

Tell us about your organization. We start within 24 hours of your go-ahead, and nothing is tested without your written authorization.